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Abstract According to Paul Seabright, ‘‘the unplanned but
sophisticated coordination of modern economies is a
remarkable fact that needs an explanation.’’ In this paper, I
explore what is remarkable about modern economies and
investigate what Seabright identifies as the aspect ‘‘that needs
an explanation.’’ Essentially, Seabright is interested in the fact
that modern economies require a great deal in the way of
trustworthy behavior (and trust) in order to function well—
and these trust relations must operate specifically among
‘‘strangers’’! The puzzle for him is how relations of trust (and
trustworthiness) among strangers could conceivably have
arisen from our tribal evolutionary past. I raise several queries
about his diagnosis of this puzzle and of his answer to it.
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Introduction
Paul Seabright’s (henceforth PS) The Company of Strang-
ers is a fascinating and highly readable book. It shows a
totally impressive—and to me admirable—disciplinary
breadth, including economics (and particularly the eco-
nomics of institutional design), evolutionary history, psy-
chology, criminology, and anthropology. It is full of
interesting speculations, little puzzles (as well as some big
puzzles), and fascinating asides.
Here is a tiny example of the latter. It represents nothing
more than a throw-away line or two in the PS narrative, but
it is clever and arresting and serves to exemplify something
of the character of the book. The example revolves around
the issue of how rational induction procedures can operate
to produce false beliefs. Here’s how it goes. Suppose that
half the airplanes that fly are empty and that the other half
are completely full. As a result, all passengers report in
total honesty on the basis of their experience that all planes
are full—and the accumulation of that testimony across the
whole sample of passengers appears to give compelling
evidence that what they say is true. But by construction, it
is false.
What is involved here is a neat ‘‘model’’ of selection
bias in induction procedures. It shows that, in some cases,
what everyone has maximal evidentiary warrant for
believing is systematically untrue. Perhaps the example is
well known in certain circles; but it was new to me. And
though, as far as I can see, it plays no great role in the
larger PS story, I found it striking; and typical of the kinds
of interesting aperçus with which the book is littered.
My chief concern here, however, is with PS’s larger
agenda—and more particularly with some lack of clarity as
to what his central thesis actually is, and how it connects
with the evidence that I see him as offering.
Here is what PS says by way of a summary introduction:
‘‘the unplanned but sophisticated coordination of modern
economies is a remarkable fact that needs an explanation’’
(p. 12).
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No economist is likely to disagree with this proposition
as it stands. But in my view, it needs some unpacking—and
unpacking specifically in relation to two questions.
First, what exactly is it about ‘‘modern economies’’ that
is ‘‘remarkable’’? And second, is what makes modern
economies ‘‘remarkable’’ the same thing that ‘‘needs an
explanation’’? In other words, what precisely is the puzzle
that PS sees at the center of the phenomenon he is trying to
explain?
I think it is clear that PS’s chief interest here lies in the
emergence of trust—and specifically of trust in strangers—
which he sees as a necessary requirement for the successful
operation of ‘‘modern economies.’’ More especially, he is
interested in the connection between such trust and what
our species carried into ‘‘modern times’’ (say from 10,000
BC onwards) from the period of our earlier evolutionary
past.
In the discussion of this big canvas picture, I seek to do
three things: (1) to indicate what seems to me to be
‘‘remarkable’’ about modern economies, and more gener-
ally about the ‘‘post-evolutionary’’ history of the human
species; (2) to indicate the role that trust specifically plays
in that history; and (3) to draw attention to what I detect as
some ambiguity in the story PS offers concerning the
connection between trust in strangers and our evolutionary
heritage.
Remarkable?
The ‘‘sophisticated coordination of modern economies’’ is
a ‘‘remarkable fact’’ mainly, I think, in the light of some-
thing yet more remarkable—namely, those economies’
amazing productive capacity. Economists since the time of
Adam Smith ([1776] 1981) have seen markets as a dis-
tinctive force for mobilizing the gains from human coop-
eration—gains that, as Smith observed, we probably would
not recognize but for the fact of their delivery. Smith’s is
not a distinctive view among economists: it is something
that PS and I and for that matter Karl Marx all share;
though as PS remarks at one point, even Adam Smith
would have been hard-pressed to imagine just how far the
processes that he observed would take us in the 250 years
since he wrote.
Consider. How much better off is the average person in
the West (the UK, for example) now as compared with,
say, 1700? This is a question we economists occasionally
pose to our undergraduates—with the predictable array of
random answers. Best estimates indicate something of the
order of 16-fold (see McCloskey (2006), following
Maddison (2001)). To see how significant this is, imagine
that global warming served to reduce material well-being
in the UK to its 1700 level: most of us would regard a
reduction in our material well-being to one 16th of its
current level as unimaginably catastrophic, and this not-
withstanding the fact that the standard of living in the UK
in 1700 was not too bad by long-term historical standards.
Or consider the increase in life expectancy in the West
since, say, 1900. It has been increasing at the rate of
slightly more than 2 years every decade over the century.
That is, those who are dying now have had, on average, a
quarter of a century more living than their ancestors a
century ago. In the earlier period much of the increase in
expected longevity was a result of reduced infant mortality;
but since 1950, it has mainly been the result of simply
longer life. On average, we are simply living rather longer
and very considerably better than at any time in human
history. Of course with the growth in world population, the
absolute number of poor persons (say those living on less
than one dollar per day) has remained very high. However,
per capita gdp across the globe has increased about eight-
fold since 1820, despite ‘‘global poverty.’’ Estimates sug-
gest that world per capita gdp rose only 50 % from 1000 AD
to 1820.
This is made all the more remarkable in that the
improvement in average living standards has gone along-
side spectacular increases in human population. Current
estimates indicate that in 10,000 BC, the world’s human
population was around 4 million. Over the next
5,000 years it rose by about another 1 million, but then
started to increase more quickly and by the birth of Christ
was 170 million (a 30-fold increase over that second
5,000 year period). By 1900, it had risen by a factor of just
less than ten and in the next century by a further factor of 6.
To focus the contrast, in the 2,000 years before Christ, the
world’s population had increased by a factor of five; in the
2,000 years after Christ it rose by a factor of 60, almost
doubling in the last 35 years.
Of course, it is no great surprise that total population
would more or less track total world production: that is just
Malthusian logic. It is, I suppose, the logic of the locust
plague—and at least some ecologists seem to regard the
human case in somewhat the same terms. But the human
case seems distinctive in several crucial respects. For one
thing, as already noted, the vast increase in human numbers
has been associated with a considerably greater increase in
total productive capacity. Malthus could explain the growth
in population given the growth in aggregate production; but
he had no explanation for the underlying increase in pro-
duction itself.
I do not know whether with other species the notion of
quality of life (average well-being) makes much sense, or
whether other species (apart from those parasitic on human
‘‘material progress’’) have enjoyed significantly increased
life span. But it does seem clear to me (as it does to PS) that
in sheer evolutionary terms, the tiny episode of human
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history is indeed utterly remarkable—and does call for an
explanation.
Smith’s account emphasizes the emergence of market
institutions. But his particular story is distinctive in a
number of respects; and in order to place PS’s gloss on the
Smithian story in context, it may be useful to say some-
thing about Smith’s distinctiveness.
Let me re-state briefly what I take to be the relevant
piece of Smith’s argument.1
(1) There are huge gains to be made from specialization
(including specialization in the making of ‘‘machines’’
and related ‘‘speculation’’—though Smith’s prime
example is the pin factory where he notes productivity
increases of the order perhaps of 4,800-fold!).
(2) Specialization is made possible by market exchange:
since man cannot live by pins alone, it is only when
agents can exchange their products that specialization
becomes possible.
(3) The extent of specialization is limited by the ‘‘extent
of the market.’’ If the size of the market were
doubled, the degree of specialization would predict-
ably increase, with correspondingly increased con-
sumption per head of all goods after exchange.
Now, the idea of the division of labor was hardly new.
Plato, Aristotle, and derivatively St. Paul, all had a clear
conception of the division of labor and the specialization
possibilities that markets allowed. In that sense, Smith
might seem just another patron of a familiar idea. But the
Platonic/Aristotelian version was based on essentially
‘‘natural’’ differences. Its rationale lay in the claim that
people had differing talents and dispositions that special-
ization allowed them to exploit for mutual benefit. The
famous (to economists) Ricardian (1817) demonstration of
the gains from (international) trade was in the Platonic/
Aristotelian spirit: ‘‘comparative advantage,’’ on which the
potential for trade depends, requires essentially natural
differences of climate. More modern explanations of
international trade emphasize other sources of comparative
advantage (differing factor proportions or political institu-
tions), but in all such cases the sources of relevant differ-
ence lie in exogenous factors. Smith’s account requires no
natural differences whatsoever—either among persons or
regions—to constitute a basis for profitable exchange. For
Smith, specialization and exchange are endogenous to the
system: the gains from specialization lie not in differences
in natural talents but in the ‘‘increasing returns’’ (or
economies of scale) that derive from specialization as such.
Suppose, for example, that we observe two absolutely
identical communities, where all pre-trade relative prices,
all individual preferences, and all natural talents are totally
identical. The Ricardian model will find no basis for
trade—no gains from trade are on offer. But in the Smi-
thian story, there will be potential gains from exchange,
because by trading across community boundaries, a more
refined division of labor (pattern of specialization)
becomes possible with benefits for all parties to the trading
nexus. Of course, Smith does not need to deny differences
in natural talents or climate or the idea of comparative
advantage for his account (though as a matter of fact, he
was rather skeptical of claimed differences in natural
ability). The critical point is that Smith does not require
such things: the primary gains from trade for Smith lie in
the productive gains from specialization as such.
Relatedly, although Smith was well aware that both
parties to any exchange saw themselves as made better off
in the relevant expected sense by that exchange, he did not
see those ‘‘direct’’ gains from exchange as the ‘‘main
game’’ in the case for exchange. In that sense, Smith differs
not just from Ricardo but also from almost all contempo-
rary economists, who have followed the Ricardian model
with its assumed ‘‘constant returns to scale’’ (largely for
reasons of analytic tractability).2 But the Smithian model
contains what the standard market models do not—namely,
an account of why it is that Malthusian style population
growth does not tend to exhaust all productivity gains and
ultimately lead to subsistence levels of well-being for all.3
To see this, note Smith’s observation that ‘‘the division
of labor is limited by the extent of the market.’’4 If the size
of the trading nexus expands, then so does the degree of
specialization and the average level of material well-being
thereby. But this means that an increase in population
creates its own production-expansion dynamic. An initial
population increase leads to a finer degree of specialization
and hence an increase in well-being per head, and thereby a
further increase in population (for the essentially Malthu-
sian reasons that Smith fully recognizes). This dynamic
interaction generates exactly the picture of increasing
population and increasing material well-being for that
population that we have in fact witnessed—spectacularly
over the last 300 years, and over the previous ten millen-
nia, more gradually and subtly.
1 The reader should perhaps be warned that this interpretation is
somewhat controversial in ways I hope to make clear. It has the virtue
that it tracks the first three chapters of The Wealth of Nations—as
anyone interested enough to consult those 23 pages can verify.
2 The famous Arrow and Debreu (1954) general equilibrium model
and the associated ‘‘two basic theorems of welfare economics’’ also
rely on the constant returns model.
3 Or more accurately, did not do so prior to the widespread
availability of reliable contraception.
4 This is the title of Smith’s third chapter.
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The Puzzle?
If this history represents a ‘‘remarkable’’ set of facts, what
is especially puzzling about them? To be sure, puzzles are
in the eye of the beholder, but the particular issue on which
PS focuses revolves around the role of trust and trustwor-
thiness in the operation of markets—a feature which
Smith’s discussion does not foreground. PS’s version of
Smith’s Chapter 3 might well be entitled: ‘‘the division of
labor is limited by the extent of trust/trustworthiness.’’
The central idea is this. Every market transaction makes
buyers and sellers interdependent in a manner that is
somewhat fragile: each party to an exchange has some
incentive not to fulfill her part of the bargain—either by
explicitly refusing to deliver, or more plausibly to deliver
something less than the trading partner expects.
A telling example of the problem is documented in Bee
Wilson’s delightful account (2008) of the dubious history
of food additives through the 19th century. Her story is
basically that as the 19th century wore on, people
increasingly relied on markets for the supply of their food
and drink. In 1800, most people grew their own crops;
many baked their own bread, cakes, and pies; many brewed
their own beer. Almost all prepared their own meals, from
ingredients that they had had a hand in preparing. They
could, therefore, have confidence that what they were
eating was what they took to be eating. But as the division
of labor in the food industry developed, more and more of
what they ate was prepared by others, to recipes that others
devised, containing elements that they had no direct
knowledge of. Buyers were then subject to a newfound
uncertainty about the contents of their meals. Sellers could
and sometimes would replace flour with chalk, coffee with
charcoal, add substances to ‘‘improve’’ the coloring of meat
or butter, and so on. Consumers were in this way vulner-
able to being ‘‘swindled’’ and sometimes ‘‘poisoned’’ (as
Wilson’s title implies) in ways that were new and followed
directly from the processes of specialization and exchange.
Unless consumers trusted the producers of the things they
bought, they would not rely on the market for their meat,
bread, and beer; they would have to produce these things
themselves. And if that were so, the modern economy
could not get off the ground. On this view, the primary
constraining factor on the operation of ‘‘modern econo-
mies’’ was the trust and trustworthiness of the agents who
composed the trading nexus. In the absence of such trust,
increased numbers would make no difference: the possible
gains from specialization could not be realized.
Now, one might think that trustworthiness (trust) would
be forthcoming as a matter of course in small close-knit
communities: the division of labor relevant to the small
tribe (characteristic of man’s evolutionary past) would be
relatively easily sustained. Each specialist ‘‘producer’’
would be readily observed, and hence fraudulent or
otherwise defective production processes easily detected.
Moreover, provision of inferior products would soon
become common knowledge across the small community:
reputation would spread quickly! And opportunities for
dissatisfied customers to punish untrustworthy producers
would be plentiful. In the small community, any producer
would have an incentive to act in a trustworthy fashion—
and the necessary trust from other members of the com-
munity would be rationally forthcoming.
But the situation is quite different in large-scale markets
where most of the transactions are anonymous, and/or
where the final consumers and producers are separated by a
long chain of intermediate producer/traders, where there is
little effective scrutiny of producers by consumers, and
little scope for punishment of defective products or
fraudulent producers apart from refraining from future
purchase (and trying a competitor). In dealing with
‘‘strangers,’’ there are much lower penalties for acting in an
untrustworthy way and hence substantially reduced incen-
tives to be trustworthy—and hence, reduced incentives to
trust. And so, the puzzle: the transition from small, largely
self-contained communities to the ‘‘modern economies’’
seems to involve a transition from justified trust to trust
based largely on faith—a transition from rational trust-
worthiness to widespread scope for fraud and default. How
is this transition possible?
Seabright’s Answer?
I take it that PS’s response to this version of the puzzle is to
draw it in rather different terms. Here is what I take to be
PS’s picture: The population is divided into trustworthy
and untrustworthy types. There is some characteristic that
acts as a signal of trustworthiness—a signal that is ‘‘reli-
able’’ in the sense that agents who exhibit the characteristic
are sufficiently likely to be trustworthy that it pays to trust
them in most situations. If this signal were totally reliable,
and all situations involved relatively small downside risks,
and if the characteristic were very easy to identify, then
only trustworthy agents would be trusted, and untrustwor-
thy agents would tend to die out. Though of course as the
number of untrustworthy agents becomes very small, it
may not pay potential trusters to make even the minimal
effort to determine whether an agent was trustworthy or
not. And then the community would become vulnerable
once again to untrustworthy types.
As the cost of determining whether the relevant char-
acteristic is present or not increases, then a larger number
of potential trusters will omit undertaking the test, and the
proportion of untrustworthy types in the population will
increase. That is, the cost of distinguishing different types,
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the reliability of the test, and the stakes in any interaction
will determine the proportion of agents who will take the
trouble to check out whether the test is satisfied—and
thereby the proportion of untrustworthy types in
equilibrium.
Moreover, untrustworthy types that can simulate the
characteristic credibly will tend to emerge, and this places
pressure on the evolution of ever finer and ever more
reliable tests of trustworthiness. There is a kind of dynamic
equilibrium in the invention of new signals, more reliable
and more robust, as existing signals become vulnerable to
imitation by untrustworthy types.
An example offered by PS of this dynamic process is the
interesting case of the smile and the laugh. The smile as a
gesture of friendship and personal concern is, PS conjec-
tures, an older form of signal, because it can be simulated
credibly: the used car salesman can have a winning smile,
without necessarily garnering much trust. The ‘‘laugh’’ by
contrast is very difficult to simulate: laughter is a much
more reliable signal of goodwill and good humor, precisely
because it is much harder to simulate laughter than smiling.
PS’s conjecture: laughter is later on the scene evolution-
arily and appears to replace the smile when smiling ceases
to be reliable.
Even in the small community, then, the emergence of
trustworthiness is no simple business. Even there, some
proportion of untrustworthy types will survive, with some
propensity for duplicitousness and inventiveness in the
appearance of trustworthiness without the reality. The
survival of trustworthiness depends not just on the advan-
tages of being trusted but rather more on the capacity of
those who are trustworthy to signal their trustworthiness in
credible ways.
The puzzle about outsiders, then, revolves less around
the issue of whether outsiders were intrinsically less
trustworthy than insiders—we might imagine that the
proportion of trustworthy types would be roughly the same
in all surviving small communities—but rather the issue of
whether the signals of trustworthiness that emerge in one
community translate to other communities. If, for example,
‘‘Orientals’’ are indeed ‘‘inscrutable’’ to Westerners, then
the capacity for a Western trader to detect the trustwor-
thiness credentials of the Oriental trader are impaired—and
vice versa. The language of signals breaks down.
But then, what becomes central in assessing the trust-
worthiness of the stranger is not an agent’s own capacity to
read the stranger’s character, but rather knowledge of what
the strangers’ own people make of him in the relevant
respects (i.e., whether he is a trusted trader in his own
community). That is, unless there is good reason to think
that the stranger will have an evolved disposition himself to
treat strangers and others differently—and this is what PS
denies. In short, there is, to be sure, a difference between
strangers and non-strangers in terms of the technology of
character assessment that is deployed; but that difference
does not seem to represent a deep problem in the extension
of trust or the expansion of markets.
Note, too, that not all signals of trustworthiness are
‘‘psychologically mediated’’ (as smiling and laughter
appear to be). Suppose a new houseoften uses a locution
invoking construction company comes to town and there is
considerable difficulty in potential buyers assessing the
quality (the durability, say) of houses built. How might the
new company, lacking an established reputation, persuade
buyers that it is not a ‘‘fly-by-night’’ operation, selling off a
stack of jerry-built houses and then moving on to the next
crop of suckers? One way might be to invest a large
amount up-front in location-specific form—perhaps an
expensive dedicated office or an expensive local advertis-
ing campaign. The double requirement is that the invest-
ment be of a kind that will only make economic sense if the
firm is to be around for a long time, and that this is a fact
readily apparent to customers. Signals of this kind operate
via the rationality of agents—but the trustworthiness that
they signal seems likely to be an evolved characteristic.
I punctuated the title for this section with a question
mark—and I want to conclude the discussion with the two
doubts that underlie that punctuation. One relates to whe-
ther this is indeed PS’s picture. The title of his book serves
to suggest that there is a deep puzzle about the networks of
trust necessary for the larger market society to operate, and
that that deep puzzle revolves specifically around the
company of ‘‘strangers.’’ The implication is twofold: that
trust within the company of non-strangers is relatively
unproblematic; and that the divide between trust of
strangers and non-strangers is deep and significant.
But the picture I have attributed to PS seems to me to
deny both claims. That picture suggests that trust and
trustworthiness was a significant problem even within pre-
modern tribal groups: after all, the signaling story requires
some proportion of untrustworthy types in ongoing evo-
lutionary equilibrium. And the logic does not suggest any
deep additional problems in assessing the trustworthiness
of strangers, even though the psychologically mediated
mechanisms of signaling seem likely to have some degree
of tribal specificity.
None of this is to deny that, as society develops in its
modern phase, mistrust of strangers may not have emerged
as a rational response to interactive circumstances. Indeed,
as I read PS, this is essentially what he thinks. Economic
development from 10,000 BC onwards meant the gradual
accumulation of transferable assets, with corresponding
incentives for collective predation and hence collective
protection. As villages sprang up (partly as collective self-
protection devices) they also developed a capacity for
aggression. And equally, those individuals who specialized
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in the provision of protection within village communities
developed the capacity to appropriate a considerable share
of the aggregate surplus for their own use. PS devotes
considerable attention to this ‘‘Hobbesian’’ aspect of
human development. But this is a late-evolutionary phe-
nomenon, in which the behavior of individual actors is to
be explained more by broadly rational prudential calcula-
tion than by bits of evolved moral disposition.
The other question mark revolves around whether PS’s
picture is plausible. He offers two grounds for it: one, that
contact with strangers through the evolutionary phase must
have been minimal; and second, that skeletal evidence
suggests that life in pre-modern society was extremely
violent. I am not sure precisely on what basis the first of
these claims rests. I know nothing of these things but would
have thought that ‘‘exchange’’ of women (either peaceable
or via occasional inter-tribal conflict) might have been
necessary to prevent an excessive narrowing of the gene
pool. And if this is so—if inter-tribal contact was less rare
than PS imagines, then the evidence of violent death need
not imply intra-tribal savagery.
Of course, this is all somewhat speculative stuff. That is
part of what makes it so interesting. Facts are few; and
there is much scope for ingenious interpretation and grand
reconstruction. And PS’s is, as I remarked at the outset, an
especially fascinating example.
Three Final Quibbles
Quibble 1
When PS characterizes the work that market institutions do
in making the ‘‘great experiment’’ (PS’s term) possible, he
often uses a locution invoking ‘‘friendship.’’ These insti-
tutions, he says, enable us to ‘‘treat strangers as friends’’
(pp. 1–9). It may seem a trifling anxiety; but this charac-
terization strikes me as mistaken and, more to the point,
misleading. Market relations are typically not relations of
friendship. Those relations are often anonymous; and,
almost always, predominantly self-regarding. The ‘‘coop-
eration’’ that they manifest is precisely not brokered by an
internalization of the interests of the other—in the way one
might take friendship to be constituted. Adam Smith
(Wealth of Nations I ii 2) puts the point this way: ‘‘in
civilized society man stands at all times in need of the
cooperation and assistance of great multitudes, while his
whole life is scarce sufficient to gain the friendship of a few
persons.’’ There are, to be sure, norms that govern market
relations. And where those norms are not observed, mar-
kets do not work well. But these are not norms of friend-
ship! And the virtues they demand are not the virtues of
friendship. McCloskey refers to them in the title of his
book as the ‘‘bourgeois virtues’’—precisely to distinguish
them from thicker and grander ‘‘virtues.’’
When for example Rawls (1971, p. 4) refers to society as
‘‘a cooperative venture for mutual advantage,’’ there is an
ambiguity in the use of the term ‘‘cooperative.’’ As the
Smith quotation indicates, for Smith, cooperation is a
descriptive fact about the outcomes that markets produce; it
is precisely not a description of the psychological dispo-
sitions of market participants. Whatever intentions Rawls
had in the use of the phrase, it is clear that many political
philosophers have seen the description to involve a certain
kind of fellow-feeling among members of society—and to
regard the absence of any such fellow-feeling as grounds
for criticism, and its presumed presence as soil in which to
grow conceptions of distributive justice or the moral
authority of national boundaries. The stakes are non-
negligible.
Quibble 2
PS talks at various points of the phenomenon of ‘‘tunnel
vision’’—and its pros and cons. I am not exactly sure what
he means by this term, but it is redolent of a concern that
again has something of a history in economics. To refer yet
again to Adam Smith (WN I 1 i), ‘‘in consequence of the
division of labour, the whole of every man’s attention
comes naturally to be directed towards some one very
simple object.’’ And Smith certainly registered ambiva-
lence towards that sharpened focus—emphasizing its
implications both for increased productive capacity and for
a possible narrowness and dulling of the mind. PS seems to
think that ‘‘tunnel vision’’ is implicated in current prob-
lems—the global financial crisis among them—but I have
to say that the status of the idea in PS’s larger explanatory
agenda is obscure to me.
Quibble 3
More generally, I am suspicious of any attempt to draw too
close a connection between man’s pre-modern evolution-
ary past and contemporary challenges to the ‘‘great
experiment.’’ The evolved psychology, under which the
division of labor emerged and took initial hold, may not be
centrally relevant to the forces that now sustain the market
system. As PS himself remarks in relation to the emergence
of money, ‘‘Understanding how the web of monetary trust
was spun in the past is not the same as understanding what
holds it in place in the present’’ (p. 94).
The point surely generalizes. Speculations about our
evolutionary past may be fascinating. But they are, in my
view, a poor resource for thinking about the global finan-
cial crisis, or climate change, or most of the other problems
that dog our current world.
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